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Abstract
We associate to each cost spanning tree problem a non-cooperative
game, which is inspired by a real-life problem. We study the Nash equi-
libria and subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game. We prove that
these equilibria are closely related with situations where agents connect
sequentially to the source. Keywords: cost spanning tree problem, equi-
libria.
1 Introduction
Many problems involving network formation have been studied in the operations
research and the economic literature. In operations research the issues most
frequently explored are efficient algorithm design and computational complexity.
The economic literature focuses on aspects such as network cost sharing and
the design of mechanisms that try to explain how networks form. Game theory,
which can be seen as a part of both operations research and economy, is a link
between both literatures.
There are several operations research problems involving networks that have
been studied using game theory. In this paper we study the cost spanning
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tree (cst) problem. Let us assume that a group of agents, located at different
geographical points, want some particular service which can only be provided by
a common supplier called the source. Agents will be served through connections
which entail some cost. The agents are not concerned with whether they are
connected directly or indirectly to the source.
The literature on cst problems starts by defining algorithms for the con-
struction of minimal cost spanning trees (mcst) (for instance, the paper by
Prim (1957)). But the construction of a mcst is only a part of the problem.
Another important issue is how to allocate the cost associated with the mcst
among agents. Claus and Kleitman (1973) introduced this problem but it was
Bird (1976) who studied it using game theory.
Bird (1976) associated a cooperative game with any cst and proposed a
cost allocation rule called Bird´s rule. Bird´s original paper generated further
literature, such as, for instance, Granot and Huberman (1984), who studied
the core and the nucleolus of the game; Feltkamp, Tijs, and Muto (2000) who
studied Bird´s rule, and Kar (2002) who studied the Shapley value. In Borm,
Hamers, and Hendrickx (2001) there is a survey of cooperative games associated
with cst problems.
In all the above papers it is assumed that agents construct a mcst and share
the cost among them in some specific way. But, if we look at some real problems
that fit into the framework of cst problems we realize that this is not the case.
In many situations what really happens is the following. First, some agents
connect to the source; later, other agents connect to the source, directly or via
agents that are already connected, and so on. It is quite possible, therefore, that
the mcst is not constructed. A logical question that arises is if there is some
underlying rationale behind this process, or whether it is a question of agent
inefficiency.
Our claim is that rational agents will be able to behave in this way. Assuming
that the need for the good provided by the supplier is different for each agent,
agent i can try to take advantage of the fact of knowing that connection is
extremely important for agent j. If agent i says ”I am not interested” but
knows that agent j will connect to the source for certain, he can later connect
to agent j at a lower cost. In Section 3 we present a real example of this
situation.
When agents make their decisions independently it seems more appropriate
to study cst problems from a non-cooperative point of view. This fits in perfectly
with the field of economics concerned with the design of mechanisms that explain
how networks are formed.
In this paper we associate with each cst problem a non-cooperative game
Γ as follows. Initially nobody is connected to the source. In Stage 1 agents
decide, simultaneously, whether or not they want to be connected to the source.
If everybody, or nobody, connects, then the game ends. Otherwise, in Stage
2, unconnected agents decide, simultaneously, if they want to be connected to
the source directly or through a previously connected agent. If everybody, or
nobody, connects, then the game ends. Otherwise, we move on to Stage 3 and
so on. Each connected agent pays the cost of his connection.
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We think that Γ is an appropriate framework for studying cst problems
where agents behave strategically and no agent can be forced to connect to the
network and pay an amount that he is unwilling to pay.
We have only considered pure strategies, which we consider logical given
the structure of the problem. We study the set of Nash equilibria (NE) and
subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of Γ.
Given an order among the agents, let us assume that they connect sequen-
tially in this order as follows: if the agents of R are already connected and it is
the turn for agent i to decide, choosing from among all the agents from R and
the source, he connects to the one with the lowest cost for him. If there are
several agents, agent i can choose any from among them. We prove that the set
of payoffs associated with NE coincides with the set of payoffs associated with
SPNE. Moreover, this set coincides with the set of payoffs associated with the
different orders of the agents.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce cst problems
and some relevant results used in our paper. In Section 3 we describe the real-
life problem forming the basis for this paper and the non-cooperative game that
models it. In Section 4 we study the set of NE and SPNE. Finally, in Section
5, we present some concluding comments.
2 The model
N denotes the set of natural numbers (we consider 0 /∈ N). Let N ⊂ N be a
finite set of agents with n = |N |, say N = {1, ..., n}. We define N0 := N ∪ {0}
in which 0 is the source.
A cost spanning tree problem, briefly cst, is a pair (N0, C) where N is the
set of agents and 0 is the source. Moreover, C = (cij)i,j∈N0 is a matrix where
cij represents the cost of the connection between agent i (the source if i = 0)
and agent j (the source if j = 0).We assume that cij ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ N, cii = 0
for all i ∈ N0, and cij = cji for all i, j ∈ N0.
Remark 1. We are assuming that cij = cji for all i, j ∈ N0 because this is
a standard assumption in the literature on cst problems. It is easy to verify the
validity of the results described in this paper if we do not make this assumption.
We denote by gN0 the set {(i, j) such that i, j ∈ N0} . A (directed) graph g
over N0 is a subset of gN0 with no cycles. The elements of g are called arcs.
Given a graph g a path from i to j is a sequence {(ih, ih+1)}l−1h=1 satisfying:
(ih, ih+1) ∈ g for all h = 1, ..., l − 1, i1 = i, and il = j.
A tree is a graph satisfying that for all i ∈ N there is a unique path from i to
the source. To any tree g we can associate a cost allocation vector cg = (cgi )i∈N
where cgi , the cost associated to agent i, coincides with cij where j is the first
agent in the unique path from i to the source.
Given a cst problem, Prim (1957) provides an algorithm for solving the
problem of connecting all agents to the source such that the total cost of creating
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the network is minimal. This algorithm leads to a tree, but not one which is
neccesarily unique.
We say that x = (xi)i∈N is a Bird’s cost allocation if it is the cost allocation
associated to some tree obtained via Prim’s algorithm.
Let ΠN be the set of all permutations over the finite set N. Given pi ∈ ΠN ,
let Pre (i, pi) denote the set of elements of N which precedes i in the order given
by pi, i. e. Pre (i, pi) = {j ∈ N | pi (j) < pi (i)} .
Given pi ∈ ΠN assume that agents connect sequentially in the order given by
pi to one of the cheapest available options. Then, we can associate a tree (not
necessarily unique) with any permutation.
We say that the tree g is induced by the permutation pi ∈ ΠN if:
g =
{
(i, ig) such that i ∈ N, ig ∈ Pre (i, pi) ∪ {0}
and ciig ≤ cij for all j ∈ Pre (i, pi) ∪ {0}
}
.
Let us suppose that any agent pays his connection cost in accordance with
g, this means that for all i ∈ N, agent i pays ciig . It is self-evident that if g
and g′ are two different trees induced by pi ∈ ΠN agents pay the same under g
as under g′. Thus it makes sense to define the cost allocation induced by the
permutation pi ∈ ΠN as the vector cpi = cg where g is a tree induced by pi.
3 The non-cooperative game
In this section we describe the real-life problem forming the basis for this paper.
We subsequently define a non-cooperative game that models this problem, thus
enabling us to understand better what happened.
The situation we describe here happened some years ago in Ourense (Spain).
The valley authority is the ”Ayuntamiento de Pereiro de Aguiar”. The descrip-
tion of the problem is based on conversations with people from Cebreiros, one
of the villages in the area.
The problem was the following. Some small villages in the valley had in-
sufficient water supply. Although everybody had a private well there was no
common water supply, and sometimes (mainly in summer), the private wells did
not provide sufficient water. The villagers informed the valley authority, which
took action:
• The valley authority constructed a dam, with pipelines connecting each
village to the dam and a water deposit for each village. The corresponding
costs were paid by the valley authority.
• Access to this water supply was free, but the cost of constructing pipelines
to connect individual houses to the supply was to be paid by the villagers.
The villagers had to inform the valley authority about the network of
pipelines to be constructed within each village, and each village had to
assume the eventual cost of this network.
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• The valley authority constructed the pipe network as per village instruc-
tions. Moreover, the valley authority was the owner of the pipes and was
ultimately responsible for their maintenance.
In our case the agents were the different houses of the village. These agents
were different in four main ways. Firstly, the number of people per household
varied (from 1 to 8). Secondly, their needs for water were different (some people
had animals, others small gardens, and others both). Thirdly, some villagers
had private wells which clearly provided more water than others. These three
differences can be summarised by stating that the needs of each house differed.
Fourthly, incomes varied. These differences could be considered common infor-
mation.
Even though the people from the village had the opportunity to construct
a mcst and share the cost they did not proceed in this way. Once the valley
authority had made its decision known, the following is what happened. Vil-
lagers started to talk among themselves trying to reach profitable agreements.
People closest to the water supply soon decided to connect directly and pay the
cost. The remaining villagers continued to talk. Finally, some of them decided
to connect to the source, whereas others argued that the cost was to high or
that they did not need additional water. Among people who connected, some
cooperated and shared the costs. It is interesting to note that some people de-
cided not to connect even though it would have cost them less than it did for
other people who decided to connect.
The valley authority proceeded to construct the pipes, once the decision was
taken.
After the system started to function, and was seen to perform well, most
of the remaining unconnected houses decided to connect to the network. They
argued that they were now interested because the cost were not so high (which
was true). Some of the people already connected to the water supply, and to
whom the unconnected households wished to connect, protested, since they felt
that part of the cost previously paid by them must now be charged to those who
wanted to connect now. Those wanting to join the network disagreed. The valley
authority decided to construct new pipes, and the people who wanted to join the
network would pay for the new pipes but were not required to compensate the
previously connected households. The reason given by the valley authority was
that the pipes were now valley authority property and hence, held in common
ownership. Thus everybody was connected to the water supply.
We believe that the valley authority had not considered this second round
when they designed the procedure. At least, they had said nothing about the
possibility of later connection when explaining their decision on the construction
of the network.
We now describe a non-cooperative game that models the process leading to
the connection tree. We study the kind of results we can expect when rational
players are in this situation.
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Given a cst (N0, C) we now formally define the non-cooperative extensive
form game Γ:
Stage 1. Agents in N1 = N decide, simultaneously, whether or not they
want to be connected to the source. Thus, the set of strategies of agent i ∈ N1
is S1i = {a, 0} where a means remaining unconnected and 0 being connected to
the source. Let M1 = {i ∈ N | si = 0} be the set of agents connected to the
source and N2 = N1 \M1. If M1 = ∅ or M1 = N1 the game ends, otherwise
we move on to Stage 2.
Assume that we have defined Stage r for all r ≤ t.We now define Stage t+1.
Stage t+1. Agents in N t+1 decide, simultaneously, whether or not they want
to be connected (to the source or some agent ofN\N t+1). The set of strategies of
agent i ∈ N t+1 is St+1i = {a, 0}∪
(
N \N t+1) . Let M t+1 = {i ∈ N t+1 | si 6= a}
be the set of agents connected in this stage and N t+2 = N t+1 \ M t+1. If
M t+1 = ∅ orM t+1 = N t+1 the game ends, otherwise we move on to Stage t+2.
This game terminates in a finite number of stages (|N | at most).
A standard assumption - at least implicitly - in the literature about cst
problems is that agents want to be connected, even when they have to pay the
highest cost given by C. We also make this assumption. We introduce it by
saying that if some agent, say i, is not connected then he pays a rather large
cost α. We can interpret α as the maximum cost under which connection to the
network is profitable.
We now define the utility function in Γ. Let z be a terminal node of Γ.
Assume that, in accordance with z, the game ends in Stage t becauseM t = ∅ or
M t = N t. Given i ∈ N two cases are possible i ∈ N t+1 or i /∈ N t+1. If i ∈ N t+1
then i is not connected. In this case we take ui (z) = −α where α > cj0 for all
j ∈ N. If i /∈ N t+1 then i is connected to some player, say i∗. In this case we
take ui (z) = −cii∗ .
Each terminal node z induces a graph gz =
{
(i, i∗) | i /∈ N t+1} . Moreover,
the utility function in z can be computed through the graph gz by considering:
ui (z) =
{ −cii∗ if (i, i∗) ∈ gz
−α otherwise.
Remark 2. It is easy to check that our results are valid by taking α > cij
for all i, j ∈ N0. Moreover, it is also possible to make ui (z) depending on agent
i when i is not connected. In this case ui (z) = −αi when i ∈ N t+1. If we take
αi > ci0 or αi > cij for all j ∈ N0 our results are still valid.
Because of the definition of Γ we know that in each stage a new subgame
begins. Then, every subgame is characterised by a triple
(
t, R, (ti)i∈R
)
where t
is the stage in which the game is, R is the set of agents connected prior to Stage
t, i. e. R = N \N t, and ti denotes the stage in which agent i made his decision
to be connected (of course 1 ≤ ti < t).
A strategy si of agent i is a map that associates, with each subgame in which
the agent is active (i /∈ R), an element of Sti = R ∪ {0, a}.
Given a cst problem with at least three agents, we consider two subgames
obtained in Stage 3. In the first subgame, only agent 1 is connected in Stage 1
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and only agent 2 is connected in Stage 2. In the second subgame, only agent 2
is connected in Stage 1 and only agent 1 is connected in Stage 2. In accordance
with Γ it is possible that agents in N \ {1, 2} behave in a different way in both
subgames. We consider that this is not very logical and that it is reasonable
to assume that the strategies of the agents depend only on the set of agents
already connected and not on the way in which these agents were connected.
Thus, in the rest of the paper, we will assume that players use stationary
strategies. In other words, the decision of the agents depends only on what ”is
on the table” and not on the way in which things are ”put on the table”.
Consider a subgame characterized by the triple
(
t, R, (ti)i∈R
)
. Under sta-
tionarity it is enough to know the set R. Thus, the subgames of Γ can be
identified with the set
X = {R ⊂ N0 such that 0 ∈ R} .
The subgame R ∈ X denotes the following situation. We are in some stage
of Γ where all agents of R \ {0} are already connected, directly or indirectly, to
the source. The number of the stage and the way in which these agents decide
to connect is irrelevant because agents are playing stationary strategies.
The information sets of the agents are the stages in which they are active.
Let us assume that si is a strategy of agent i ∈ N . Thus, si can be identified
with a map from Xi into {a} ∪N0 \ {i} where
Xi = {R ⊂ N0 such that i /∈ R and 0 ∈ R}
and si (R) ∈ {a} ∪R for all R ∈ Xi.
Since we work only with pure strategies any combination of strategies s =
(si)i∈N induces a unique terminal node, denoted by z
s. Of course, ui (s) =
ui (zs) for all i ∈ N.
The combination of strategies s also induces a graph, denoted by gs, which
coincides with gz
s
. Let us assume that, in accordance with s, any agent i is
connected (i. e. if t is the last stage of the game, N t+1 = ∅). Then, gs is a tree.
4 Nash equilibria and subgame perfect Nash equi-
libria
In this section we study the set of Nash equilibria (NE) and subgame per-
fect Nash equilibria (SPNE) for the non-cooperative game Γ. For a detailed
description of NE and SPNE see, for example, van Damme (1991).
The main result of this section is a characterisation of the set of NE and
SPNE in terms of the trees and cost allocations associated with the set of
permutations.
Theorem 1. If pi ∈ ΠN and g is a tree induced by pi, there exists an SPNE
s = (si)i∈N such that g
zs = g and u (s) = −cpi.
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Proof. Assuming that pi ∈ ΠN and g is a tree induced by pi. We suppose,
without loss of generality, that pi (i) = i for all i ∈ N. Remember that if g is
induced by pi then
g = {(i, ig) such that i ∈ N, ig < i, and ciig ≤ cij for all j < i} .
Given i ∈ N we define the strategy si as follows. For each R ⊂ Xi, we select
an agent iR ∈ R such that iR coincides with ig when ig is an agent of R with
lowest cost connection for agent i (i. e. ig ∈ R and ciig ≤ cij for all j ∈ R).
Otherwise we take as iR one of the agents of R with the lowest cost connection
for agent i (i. e. iR ∈ R and ciiR ≤ cij for all j ∈ R). In the last case iR 6= ig.
Now,
si (R) =
{
iR if Pre (i, pi) ⊂ R
a otherwise.
Under si agent i connects if and only if all the agents who precede him in
permutation pi are already connected. In this case he connects to any of the
agents already connected with lowest cost. Note that this agent must be ig
when ciig is one of the lowest cost connection available.
Let us assume that any agent i plays si. Then, for any Stage t (t = 1, ..., n)
agent t connects to tg and agents of N \ (Pre (t, pi) ∪ {t}) remain unconnected.
Now it is easy to conclude that g = gz
s
. Thus, ui (s) = −ciig = −cpii for all
i ∈ N .
Let s′i be a strategy of agent i different from si. We denote by s \ s′i the
combination of strategies where any agent j ∈ N \ {i} plays sj and i plays s′i.
We distinguish several cases:
Let us assume that s′i (0) 6= si (0) = a. Thus, s′i (0) = 0 and hence,
ui (s \ s′i) = −ci0 ≤ ui (s) because ui (s) = −ciig ≥ −cij for all j ∈ Pre (i, pi) ∪
{0} .
Let us assume that s′i (0) = si (0), s
′
i ({0, 1}) 6= si ({0, 1}) , and i > 1 (if i = 1
we go to the general case below). Thus, ui (s \ s′i) ≤ max {−ci0,−ci1} ≤ ui (s).
If we repeat this argument it results that for all j < i if
s′i (Pre (j − 1, pi) ∪ {0}) = si (Pre (j − 1, pi) ∪ {0}) and
s′i (Pre (j, pi) ∪ {0}) 6= si (Pre (j, pi) ∪ {0})
thus, ui (s \ s′i) ≤ ui (s) .
Let us assume that
s′i (Pre (j, pi) ∪ {0}) = si (Pre (j, pi) ∪ {0}) for all j < i and
s′i (Pre (i, pi) ∪ {0}) 6= si (Pre (i, pi) ∪ {0}) = ig.
We distinguish two cases. Firstly, s′i (Pre (i, pi) ∪ {0}) = a. Thus, the game
ends and ui (s \ s′i) = −α < −ciig = ui (s) . Secondly, s′i (Pre (i, pi) ∪ {0}) ∈
Pre (i, pi) ∪ {0}. Thus, ui (s \ s′i) ≤ max
j∈(Pre(i,pi)∪{0})\{ig}
{−cij} ≤ −ciig = ui (s).
Let us now assume that s′i (Pre (j, pi) ∪ {0}) = si (Pre (j, pi) ∪ {0}) for all
j ≤ i. Because of the definition of Γ and s we conclude that ui (s \ s′i) = ui (s) .
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Thus, s is a NE.
It just remains for us to prove that s induces a NE in any subgame of Γ
different from the whole game. Let R ∈ X be a subgame of Γ. We denote by
piN\R the order induced by pi in N \ R. We assume that piN\R = {i1, ..., in−r}
and the subgame R corresponds to Stage t.
If we apply s to subgame R we obtain the following. In Stage t agent
i1 connects to iR1 whereas agents of {i2, ..., in−r} choose a. Then, the game
proceeds to Stage t + 1. In this stage i2 connects to i
R∪{i1}
2 whereas agents
of {i3, ..., in−r} choose a. The procedure continue in this way until agent in−r
connects to iN\{in−r}n−r .
Now using arguments similar to those used when we proved that s is a NE
we can conclude that s induces a NE in the subgame given by R. 
Since every SPNE is a NE, the next result is an immediate consequence of
Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. If pi ∈ ΠN and g is a tree induced by pi, there exists a NE
s = (si)i∈N such that g
zs = g and u (s) = −cpi.
In the next theorem we obtain the reciprocal of Corollary 1.
Theorem 2. If s = (si)i∈N is a NE there exists pi ∈ ΠN and a tree g
induced by pi such that g = gz
s
and cpi = −u (s) .
Proof. Let us assume that s = (si)i∈N is a NE and T is the number of the
stage in which the game ends when agents play s.
Let M t denote the set of agents connected at Stage t when agents play s.
We first prove that {M t}Tt=1 is a partition of N. By definition of Γ, M t ∩
M t
′
= ∅ when t 6= t′. Suppose ∪Tt=1M t 6= N and i ∈ N \
(∪Tt=1M t). Thus,
ui (s) = −α. Let s′i be a strategy of agent i satisfying that s′i (0) = 0. Then,
ui (s \ s′i) = −ci0 > −α, which is a contradiction because s is a NE.
Thus, gz
s
can be written as gz
s
= {(i, i∗) such that i ∈ N} and ui (s) =
−cii∗ for all i ∈ N .
We associate with s a permutation pi ∈ ΠN satisfying the following condition:
if i ∈ M t, j ∈ M t′ , and t < t′ then pi (i) < pi (j) . Notice that it is possible for
several permutations to satisfy this condition.
We assume, without loss of generality, that pi (i) = i for all i ∈ N. We now
prove that gz
s
is a tree induced by pi. It is enough to prove that for all i ∈ N,
cii∗ ≤ cij for all j < i. Let i be an agent of M t, j < i, and j 6= i∗. By the
definition of pi, j ∈M t′ with t′ ≤ t (if j = 0 we take M0 = {0}). Let s′i be such
that s′i
(
M0
)
= s′i
(
M0 ∪M1) = ... = s′i (∪t′−1q=0Mq) = a, s′i (∪t′q=1Mq) = j
when t′ < t, and s′i
(∪t−1q=1Mq ∪ (M t \ {i})) = j when t′ = t. Since s is a NE we
have:
−cij = ui (s \ s′i) ≤ ui (s) = −cii∗ .
By our definition of cpi we know that cpii = cii∗ for all i ∈ N . 
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Since every SPNE is a NE the next result is an immediate consequence of
Theorem 2.
Corollary 2. If s = (si)i∈N is an SPNE there exists pi ∈ ΠN and a tree g
induced by pi such that g = gz
s
and cpi = −u (s).
Corollary 1 and Theorem 2 give an equivalence between the payoffs and trees
associated with the set of NE and those of the set of permutations. Theorem 1
and Corollary 2 state that the same equivalence holds for SPNE. Nevertheless,
the sets of NE and SPNE are different. It is possible to find a combination of
strategies s which is a NE but not an SPNE.
These results are interesting from the computational point of view. There
is a component of the game theory literature devoted to defining algorithms
for computing solutions, for instance NE or SPNE. Given the equivalence be-
tween SPNE (or NE) and permutations, Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2002) have
constructed an algorithm to compute all the payoffs associated with SPNE.
We end this section computing the set of NE and SPNE in an example.
Example 2. Consider the cst problem (N0, C) where N = {1, 2, 3} and C
is given by:
Figure.1
dtbpF2.2693in1.7037in0ptgrafico3.wmf
In the following table we compute the payoffs and trees associated to NE
and SPNE via the permutations
pi g cpi
123 0← 1← 2← 3 (10, 15, 5)
132 0← 1← 3← 2 (10, 5, 20)
213 1→ 0← 2← 3 (10, 30, 5)
231 1→ 0← 2← 3 (10, 30, 5)
312 1→ 0← 3← 2 (10, 5, 25)
321 1→ 0← 3← 2 (10, 5, 25)
This example enables us to make the following comments: Two different
permutations can generate the same tree and cost allocation and, hence, the
same equilibrium.
In our example the cost allocation associated with permutation 123 is the
Bird’s cost allocation. In general, for any cst problem, the Bird’s cost allocation
can always be obtained as the cost allocation associated with some permutation.
Then, Bird’s cost allocation is the payoff of an SPNE.
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5 Concluding comments
We conclude our paper by posing some interesting questions about this model.
The previous example shows that the cost allocation associated with some
SPNE are dominated. Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2002) characterise the set of
undominated SPNE in terms of the tree they induce within the subclass of cst
problems where preferences are strict, i. e. for any agent the cost of connection
to two different agents is different (given i ∈ N and j, k ∈ N0 \ {i} , j 6= k, then,
cij 6= cik).
In the cooperative approach to cst problems it is assumed that agents can
pay any connection cost. This assumption could be unrealistic in some cases.
For instance, the utility of been connected would not be enough to compensate
agents if they had to pay high connection costs. Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2003)
study this issue in the non-cooperative framework.
In TU games the Weber set (Weber (1988)) is the convex hull of the vectors
of the marginal contributions obtained from the permutations. Moreover, the
Shapley value is the average of these vectors. In our model we can also define a
Weber set as the average of the payoffs associated with the permutations. Have
this set interesting properties?
In our real-life example some agents cooperate as they were members of the
same family. We could include this behaviour in our model by allowing agents,
in each stage, to coordinate their actions and share the associated cost in some
specific way. It will also be interesting to make the utility of having the reource
depending on the stage in which an agent got connected, in the sense that the
more the connection is delayed, the lower the utility becomes. Notice that the
decrease of the utility could be different for each agent.
It was also showed that some agents complained when other agents got
connected in the second stage. It is of course possible to oblige agents who
enter the network later to pay an additional cost as compensation to the agents
already connected. But, is it possible to include all these aspects in the non-
cooperative game Γ, maintaining the positive properties and obtaining a fairer
share-out of cost?
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